On Wednesday 4^th September 2024, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry published its Phase 2 Report into the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14^th June 2017, which resulted in the deaths of 72 people.
A damning report

The 1700 pages report highlights failures by the government, local authorities, contractors, and manufacturers, citing incompetence, dishonesty, and greed. According to the inquiry chair, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, those named in the report bear different degree of responsibility for the disaster, yet each contributed to the tragedy in one way or another.

Considering the thorough assessment of failings involved and the extent of recommendations provided in the report, it seems fair to assume that significant changes to legislation will follow; however, since it took 7 years for the final report to be published, it is unlikely this will happen very soon.

An avoidable tragedy

The deaths of the 72 people in the Grenfell Tower fire were deemed avoidable, with multiple parties failing in their responsibilities over the years.

Amongst those identified to have failed in their responsibilities are:

• The Government (successive governments);
• The National House Building Council (NHBC);
• Local Authority Building Control (LABC);
• The London Fire Brigade (LFB);
• The Building Research Establishment (BRE);
• The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS);
• The Tenant Management Organisation (TMO);
• The British Board of Agrément (BBA);
• Manufacturers such as Arconic, Kingspan, Celotex, and Siderise;
• Contractors involved in Grenfell`s refit, including Studio E (architect), Rydon (principal contractor) and Harley Facades (sub-contractor); and
• The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC).

Key Findings

The key findings of the report include, amongst others:

• failure of successive governments to act, despite experts raising an alarm about cladding fires as early as 1992, after the Knowsley Heights fire in Huyton, Merseyside;
• serious deficiencies in the management of building safety in England and Wales;
• manufacturer Arconic concealed the true extent of the danger of using its product, the Reynobond 55 cladding;
• ‘systematic dishonesty’ of those who made and sold the cladding, including Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan;
• privatisation of The Building Research Establishment (BRE), which exposed it to ‘unscrupulous product manufacturers’;
• indifference to fire safety by the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), including in relation to handling complaints, remedying defects identified in fire risk assessments, installing and maintaining fire protection systems and routine inspection and maintenance of fire doors;
• poor management of Grenfell` refit by both contractors and the TMO.
• failures of the London Fire Brigade around staff training as well as lack of a strategy to evacuate the building; and
• inappropriate fire testing regime, including the use of ‘Class 0’ as a standard of fire performance for products to be used on the external wall of tall buildings.

Recommendations

The final report includes almost 60 recommendations, many of which are focused on the construction industry.

The key recommendations include:

• the appointment of a single construction regulator, in control of all aspects of the construction industry;
• a review of the definition of higher-risk building, taking into consideration not only the height threshold but other factors such as vulnerability of residents;
• bringing responsibility for all aspects of fire safety (currently delivered by multiple Government departments) under one department and a single secretary of state;
• a licensing scheme for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings;
• regulation and compulsory accreditation of fire risk assessors;
• recognition and protection by law of the fire engineering profession and the establishment of an independent body to regulate it;
• the Government to make it clear that BS 9414 should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.
• a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer to be submitted with building control applications (at Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion (Gateway 3);
• the establishment of a College of Fire and Rescue with sufficient resources to provide training and education services to fire and rescue services nationally;
• the establishment of a Chief Construction Advisor to provide advice on matters affecting the construction industry;
• a review of the building control functions;
• product manufacturers to provide all relevant test results that support fire safety claims; full history of tests – including failures – to be included in product certificates;
• the review of Approved Document B, followed by a revised version as soon as possible;
• the current guidance on preparing for emergencies, currently contained in several documents, to be revised and consolidated in one document.

The Inquiry panel also recommends that the Government should maintain a record of recommendations made by public inquiries and select committees, describing the steps taken in response to or the reason for not accepting a recommendation, and report annually to parliament. The record should be publicly accessible.

Over the course of Phase 1 and Phase 2, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (opened in September 2017) has disclosed over 320,000 documents, took over 1600 witness statements and held more than 300 public hearings. The investigation revealed failures by the government, local authorities, contractors, and manufacturers and provided an extensive list of recommendations which aim to ensure tragedies like the Grenfell fire will never repeat.